Introduction: On Race, Roots/Routes, and Sovereignty in Latin America's Afro-Indigenous Multiculturalisms

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By Way of Introduction . . .

There are many things at stake when writing the introduction to a special issue entitled "Entre 'lo indio' y 'lo negro'," which is about contemporary multicultural regimes and Afro-Indigenous subjectivities in Latin America. We focus the issue in this way in large part as an explicit reaction to a state-supported politics of recognition that is already well underway and that has been on the rise in the region for the last couple of decades. From the point of view of various state governments in Latin America, and in coordination with the interests of multilateral development institutions, Afro-descendant and indigenous peoples have unquestionably emerged as the region's most "visible" multicultural subjects.

We conceptualize the problem in terms of Afro-Indigenous multiculturalisms as a means to talk about the way contemporary states project a potential, if not in practice an actual, ethno-cultural and racial equivalence between Afro-descendant and indigenous populations in the region. Often they do so at the very least in the abstract in terms of the way the emerging politics of ethno-cultural recognition, the rhetoric of equal opportunity and affirmative action, and the hypothetically equal distribution of (white-mestizo) national guilt form part of a broader discussion among states, civil society organizations, and other social actors.

Yet, we also recognize that framing the issue around potential equivalences found in Afro-Indigenous multiculturalisms immediately brings up other problems. Recognition of some often means non-recognition of others. Equal opportunity for

some translates into non-opportunity for others. Actions that appear to be motivated by guilt easily result in false apologies, in effect redrawing the lines of exclusion slightly differently rather than actually erasing them. Therefore, we seek to investigate well beyond the ideological layers of potential ethno-cultural and racial equivalence—and to move beyond the hypothetically equal portions of guilt that states now attempt to re-distribute—to address another pressing question: In what ways do Afro-Indigenous multiculturalisms reinstantiate the very historical problems of racism, inequality, and ethno-cultural assimilation they purportedly propose to redress?

The various contributors to this issue clearly recognize the global dimensions to multicultural thinking and legislation, and the responses to them. Seen as a whole the issue adds two specific layers to those global dimensions. The first is the emergence of a certain kind of multicultural specificity in the Latin American region, where various state governments tend to target primarily Afro-Indigenous subjects in their respective multicultural reform processes (to the exclusion of course of multiple other multicultural possibilities). Second, we also seek to specify beyond the regional level to identify some important differences in how the global and regional dimensions of multicultural ideologies are adapted to particular contexts. The precise contours of each historical and ethnographic context depend on the peculiarities that arise within national, sub-regional, and intra-regional articulations of multicultural policies as they are implemented by different states. Striking an appropriate balance between conceptual theorization, regional/global generalizations, and contextual location is perhaps an ambitious objective. But it is one this issue strives toward.

Contemporary recognition of Afro-Indigenous subjects is particularly evident in the steady ideological shift away from assimilationist models of Latin American nation-states over the last few decades. Earlier eras characterized by the racist ideologies of *blanqueamiento*, *mestizaje*, and *mulataje* (cf. Rahier 2003) have given way to the globalizing ideologies of inter-ethnic tolerance, identity politics, cultural citizenship, and contemporary reparations for the past wrongs associated with slavery and colonial domination. Donna Lee Van Cott (2000:266–267) demonstrates that at least eight Latin American countries have incorporated multicultural or multi-ethnic rhetoric into their constitutions. Other legislative initiatives, ranging from popular participation laws and collective land titling to intercultural-bilingual educational policies and ethnically tinged electoral politics, are equally saturated with the rhetoric of culture while simultaneously frustrated by the realities of race.

Afro-Indigenous multiculturalisms are globally visible in—and in part constituted through—a series of international legal frameworks and multilateral development policies. The most often remarked upon in terms of indigenous rights platforms are: the International Labor Organization's Convention 169, adopted in

1989; the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, recently adopted by the UN's Human Rights Council and possibly up for a vote in the General Assembly in the fall of 2007; and the World Bank's revised Operational Policy/Bank Procedure 4.10 on indigenous peoples, in effect since the early 1990s. The international profile of Afro-descendants in Latin America has also been rising in recent years. This too is due in part to a series of World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank projects that specifically target "Afro-Latino" populations and events like the UN's World Conference against Racism held in Durban, South Africa in 2001, which served as a catalyst for region-wide networking among Afro-descendant activists.

In certain state arenas, a related, if by no means synonymous, process of politicizing Afro-Indigenous identities is underway through affirmative action type legislation. Prominent examples include Brazil's recent efforts to implement quota policies in university education and government hiring and Peru's adoption of a law in 2002 that requires those political parties operating in Amazonian provinces to meet ethnic quotas of 15%, effectively mandating the inclusion of native Amazonians on their candidate lists (see Htun 2004a, 2004b). As Htun's work suggests, affirmative action policies (which typically manifest in terms of target or mandated quotas) typically operate on a self-canceling logic. The assumption that lies behind affirmative action is that such policies are only needed as a temporary remedy until the patterned inequalities in the exercise of civil rights among differently racialized groups disappear. At such time, when basic civil rights would ostensibly be fully recognized for everyone equally in the national citizenry (and thus prior racial status removed as a barrier to full citizenship), no further special treatment for racialized groups would be required.[1]

Htun suggests that by contrast other institutional measures—those that fall under what we typically refer to as "multicultural" reforms (for example, the reservation of congressional seats for indigenous minorities written into Colombia's 1991 Constitution)—entail a different logic. Here, the assumption is one of a quasi-permanent recognition of an ethno-cultural status group. The result, she says, is a logic of self-perpetuation. The group is assumed to have continually existed and to continue existing into the future as ethno-culturally distinct from the rest of the national citizenry. Such groups are not deemed in need of temporary special treatment so much as they are deemed worthy of permanent group rights. The result reconstitutes the national body as one permanently divided across ethno-cultural groups.

One might well wonder if Htun's contrast between the self-canceling logic of affirmative action initiatives and the self-perpetuating logic of multicultural reforms maps onto the contrast Hooker (2005) makes between the racialized citizenship of Afro-descendants and the ethnicized citizenship of indigenous peoples

in Latin America. The comparison would seem appropriate. Hooker's analysis suggests that, in contrast to the "official" view that indigenous groups represent a distinct ethno-cultural difference worthy of permanent group rights, most Latin American states view Afro-descendants primarily as "second class citizens." In other words, Afro-descendants form part of a marginalized collective due to histories of racism but do not represent bearers of a distinct cultural status worthy of permanent group recognition.

While both perspectives seem relevant they also tend to operate on a series of over-simplified contrasts: race on one side, ethnicity on the other; affirmative action/civil rights on one side; multicultural reforms on the other. Peter Wade's (1997:39) work suggests instead that we need to think in terms of the complex interdependency between race and ethnicity, phenotypical and cultural designators of social identity. I would add to this that the race versus ethnicity contrast, when drawn too sharply, implicitly overlooks something extremely important in terms of the historical relation between affirmative action, civil rights, and multiculturalism. Each one of these political logics emerges as a direct, and thus related, response to past global history. Indeed, the various histories of racism, ethno-cultural exclusion and assimilation, and ethno-racialized economic domination are precisely what such policies (in theory at least) seek to address. They emerge as related to a politics of historical, and collectively white (or, perhaps in the case of Latin America, mestizo-white), guilt which is now explicitly articulated through the structures of nation-state and international governance (cf. Barkan 2000).

The idea that we can neatly separate between logics of self-cancellation and self-perpetuation, racialized citizenship and ethno-cultural citizenship, civil rights and multicultural recognition, seems a bit premature. How institutions of governance view their subjects is not always (and probably never) how the subjects of governance view themselves. Recognition of the historical racialization of a particular group by the state, made visible through affirmative action initiatives, can easily lead to an emergent politics of ethno-cultural (re)affirmation by the "racial" group in question in addition to campaigns based on anti-racist, "equal opportunity" politics. Likewise, official ethno-cultural recognition is in no way at all an escape from the everyday and institutionalized practices of racism. Indeed, one could plausibly argue that it only assures the perpetuation of racism against what becomes a fully institutionalized, and thus more "easily" recognizable, "ethno-cultural" group.

In short, it seems clear that self-cancellation and self-perpetuation, affirmative action and multicultural initiatives, are not two opposed logics but two, slightly different, and related logics that form part of a broader ethno-cultural, racial, and political imaginary. If we conceptualize the issue here in terms of Afro-Indigenous multiculturalisms, it is not to only invoke the term "culture." It is merely one of a

number of ways to address how today's emerging "ethno-cultures" are inseparably related to the history of ideas concerning human "races."

In what follows I layout a preliminary vision of Afro-Indigenous multiculturalisms in Latin America organized under the broad rubrics of race, roots/routes, and sovereignty. I first attempt to link this vision to the excellent historical overview of how and where the categories of *lo indio* and *lo negro* emerged and in opposition to what as presented by Norman Whitten Jr. in the first article. Whitten's article reminds us that in order to understand the categories of "lo indio" and "lo negro" we must refamiliarize ourselves with the ways in which race, culture, and history are inseparably linked. This is particularly true in terms of the various processes through which the concepts of "race" and "culture" historically emerge to take on an apparently global, "fixed" referent. And yet what many scholars of race now recognize is that race concepts have also proven to be extremely "fluid" both in practice and in politics, leading to a need to re-locate their ostensibly global referents within more localized contexts.

I investigate the roots/routes metaphor as a way to think beyond the apparent dichotomy of the indigenous as an essentially immovable (rooted) identity and the African diasporic as an essentially movable (uprooted/routed) identity. The potential for equivalence is found in various places throughout this issue. For example, as scholars we might reconsider what happens when we juxtapose certain literatures, which as Restrepo (this issue) points out, are often kept implicitly separate as a result. A potential equivalence of Afro-Indigenous subjects emerges, for example, if one juxtaposes contemporary studies on the African diaspora with that on the process of cholification, a term which connotes indigenous mobility (cf. Greene, this issue). Here, Mark Anderson's article on Garifuna activism in Honduras is particularly interesting since it suggests there are in fact spaces within Latin America's multiculturalisms where the state explicitly recognizes a kind of Afro-Indigenous equivalence. We might also consider those spaces in which activists work to establish a joint Afro-Indigenous recognition like in the intercultural education projects being carried out in Lima, Callao by the Organización de Desarrollo de los Afro-Chalacos as described by Guillermo Muñoz Almenerio in this issue.

The last section attempts to reveal how these potentially important instances of Afro-Indigenous equivalence go largely unrecognized in many of the "official" recognition processes associated with multicultural states. Bettina Ng'weno's article, based on an ethnographic examination of some fascinating Colombian legal cases, provides considerable evidence to support this. In that national context, it is only a certain kind of Afro-descendant (inhabiting the Pacific coast) who gains recognition as ethno-culturally equivalent to indigenous subjects while others are treated as racialized subjects. My own article about the multicultural reforms of the Alejandro Toledo government also provides an analysis of the ways in which Peru's

state multiculturalism divides Afro-Indigenous subjects. Yet I argue that to understand multiculturalism in that context one has to understand how the spatialization of difference across the *costa*, *sierra*, and *selva* complicates the division between "lo indio" and "lo negro."

One way to conceptualize this problem of the differences found in comparing various Afro-Indigenous multiculturalisms is in terms of a continuum of different conceptual models. As Eduardo Restrepo points out in his postscript to the issue, there appear to be contexts in which "lo negro" and "lo indio" are always equivalent, others in which they are circumstantially equivalent, and others still where they are almost impossible to reconcile. As he instructs us, the details of which model is operating—and thus which intellectual geneaologies of race and culture are at play—are found by placing the model into ethnographic and historical context.

In response to certain recognizable patterns in the "official" processes of recognition associated with Afro-Indigenous multiculturalisms, I argue in the final section of the introduction that this is due in part to the apologetic nature of multicultural reforms and the assumptions about popular sovereignty they imply. Gil Inoach Shawit's contribution on indigenous movements across the various Andean states demonstrates clearly that the contemporary discourse about multiculturalism is inherently tied to ideas about nationalism and thus about peoplehood. In my interpretation, what it means to be recognizable as a "people"—and thus for the apologetic multicultural state to begin to recognize the semi-sovereignty of certain Afro-Indigenous subjects—is centrally at play. The end result is that states engage in a strategic recognition of certain Afro-Indigenous subjects in part as a strategy to not recognize certain others. I conclude by arguing that the emptily apologetic mode of governance represented by Afro-Indigenous multiculturalisms is founded in part on logics of loss, recuperation, and retention of popular sovereignty that strategically divide Afro-Indigenous subjects.

On Race (In Culture)

We no doubt risk a bit by placing such emphasis on the terms indio and negro. We do so to recognize the way the racialized cultural legacies of lo indio and lo negro continue to reappear within contemporary Latin American nation-states' attempts to account for (and in theory become apologetically accountable for) the colonial past in the very creation of the multicultural, Afro-Indigenous present.

We start, in other words, from the basic assumption that many contemporary scholars of race start from (cf. Thomas and Clarke 2006). Any discussion of race must also already be a discussion of culture. This is true in (at least) two senses. First, the ostensibly universal "fixity" of racial categories like "negro," "indio," and

"blanco" in fact took root in and were then routed through particular historical processes and cultural practices. Most notable here are the cultures of European colonial expansion to the "New World," the institutional practices associated with colonial statecraft and trans-Atlantic slavery, and the scientific racisms that sought to justify the practices of unfreedom that make up the "modern" world we all—albeit from very different locations—inhabit (cf. Whitten, this issue).

Second, as Whitten's contribution to this issue makes clear, the idea of fixed, discursive, racial categories has historically contrasted with their extreme fluidity in practice. They are defined differently according to context, according to class, gendered, and generational position, according to location, and according to time and situation. This is due in part to the proliferation of intermediate, often times quasi-quantifiable and explicitly legalized, racial categories. Racial in-betweeness is particularly prominent in Latin America. The colonial *casta* system sought to explicitly measure, catalog, and institutionalize "mixed breeds" using a dizzying number of categories, some of which later became central in the construction of national imaginaries (most notably, the "mestizo" figure).

The "fluidity" of racial concepts is even more evident in the simple fact that their ostensible "fixity" never became fully "fixed." In many ways the "scientific" interventions of the 18th and 19th centuries into the terrain of race theory—the very ones that sought to ground them in universals of human biological difference—now make the cross-contextual fluidity of this purported biological fixity all the more evident. As the vast contemporary literature on the sociology and anthropology of race attests, race categories have always been and will always be inherently relational: representing not things-in-themselves but quasi-things in relation to other quasi-things. They simply make no sense without reference to the cultural and historical contexts through which they are attributed different meanings, boundaries, and overlaps (see also Restrepo, this issue).

Official multiculturalisms—and the various affirmative actions associated with them—emerged in the latter half of the 20th century precisely as measures to address these historical unfreedoms. And here there is a similar process of de-localization afoot. In an irony that perhaps only anthropologists can fully appreciate, the Euro-American idea that best encapsulates the difference produced by context and local peculiarity—the natives call it "culture"—has gone global (cf. Sahlins 1993). The spread of "culture" through institutions of bureaucratic governance helps to assure that its peculiar genealogical roots in Cicero's Rome, its distinct route through Herder's counter-Enlightenment Germany, as well as its various re-rootings in and re-routings through the discipline of (German-American) anthropology, get entirely lost in the process. The result is an emergent horizon of apparently naturalized ethno-cultural fixity. Indeed, we appear to be witness to the "official" emergence of ostensibly fixed ethno-cultures not at all unlike (and in fact deeply related

to) the now debunked "races" of yesteryear. This inevitably serves to sublimate the on-going processes associated with multicultural fluidity, not to mention the fluidity in the concepts of culture (cf. Turner 1993). To avoid this problem we propose to start with the very simple idea that "multiculturalism" is not one phenomenon but many. Making the shift to multiculturalisms depends precisely on identifying the ways in which insertion of "multiculturalism"—as an abstracted ideology and homogenizing governance policy—into differing historical and cultural contexts produces results that are in fact particular to those contexts.

This problem of sublimation—of recognizing "culture" as an emergent global category while nonetheless failing to recognize how often it is emptied of any particular content other than generic "difference" through multicultural governance— is sometimes made less, rather than more, apparent by contemporary scholarship on multiculturalism. There are the more hermeneutical circlings popular among political philosophers (see Taylor 1994; Kymlicka 1996) and the "institution-only" models favored by many political scientists (Van Cott 2000; Hooker 2006; Sieder 2002; Htun 2004b). One of the things these accounts share is a tendency toward abstraction above the level of contextual detail needed to decipher the term "culture's" ideological roots and routes while simultaneously paying attention to the way the term "culture" is re-rooted in and re-routed through specific cultural contexts. The philosophers inevitably get the intellectual genealogy of "culture," the idea, right, only to miss the chance to fully locate empirically observable cultural processes on the ground. Political scientists inevitably get the comparative state analysis right, only to miss the chance to locate "culture" (or "cultural politics") anywhere except inside institutions.

Charles Hale's (2006a) recent work on neoliberal multiculturalism—theorized as an emergent, global mode of culturally-friendly capitalist governance that carefully weeds out all the ethnic "radicals" who might challenge the political-economic structure of the neoliberal state—strikes me as much more contextualized. He attempts to anchor his Gramscianism in a close examination of the peculiarities of Guatemalan history and culture, to demonstrate how multiculturalism is adopted within and adapted to that particular context. How far the model goes to explain cases of multicultural reform outside of Guatemala is far from clear at the moment, although certain of the contributions to this special issue would apply it to other contexts in Central America (see Anderson, this issue).

In a nutshell: By now within the sphere of critical race theory there are widespread intellectual maneuvers to re-locate "race" within cultural and historical contexts after the apparently "scientific" attempts to biologically globalize racial difference. This trend seems so widespread among race scholars that Clarke and Thomas (2006:3) in a recent volume are forced to wonder, "How might we recuperate the power of race as a central category of social analysis without either falling

into essentialisms or forestalling the possibility of developing a critical analysis that overarches the specificities of location?" Their answer is not terribly different from that reflected in this volume. They present an introduction that attempts to draw something of an "overarching" or global picture of the continuing analytical value of the concept of "race." They then immediately balance it with a series of individual chapters dedicated to show how "race" takes on "specific" meanings within particular "locations."

However, it strikes me that the challenge to re-locate "culture" in the midst of its apparent multicultural globalization—and thus to balance "culture," the idea, with an understanding of how this idea is articulated differently according to its institutional adoption within specific locations—perhaps still lies ahead. The articles in this issue hopefully contribute a little to such a project. Any broadly construed theoretical, broadly regional, or global historical introduction to issues of race and ethno-cultures—like all attendant discussions about their implication in emerging multiculturalisms—should be heavily moderated by efforts aimed at emphasizing the importance of ethnographic and historical contextualization.

This not only involves an examination of why the institutions of the state and of global capitalist governance come to recognize "culture" in the abstract; it also involves an understanding of how the institutional cultures that pervade these institutions affect the ways in which "culture" ends up being recognized. It requires not only an analysis of the ideological instruments of law and order that such institutions embody but also a close examination of the contexts in which such ideologies take hold over specific social actors and how some others undertake a politics of opposition to such ideologies. It demands a deep engagement with the pragmatic and the peformative, the consciously formed and unconsciously formative dimensions of social action that give meaning to race, culture, and multiculturalisms "on the ground."

On Roots/Routes (and Cholification)

We refer to lo indio and lo negro at another level to reference the praxeological nature of working within while simultaneously trying to work around racialized cultural categories. Multicultural actors in Latin America are not only rooted in, and routed through, categories like indio and negro—and of course the multiple other terms implicated in their construction (from *criollo* to *cholo*; *mestizo* to *moreno*; *zambo* to *salvaje*). They also actively seek to re-root and re-route them. This takes place through the various acts of creative appropriation, organized resistance, symbolic embodiment, and multiple other *manipulaciones* that challenge past and present formulations of Afro-Indigeneity.

The roots/routes metaphor is one that is widely applied to talk about the occasionally polarizing dimensions of debating the African diaspora in the Americas (see Gilroy 1995; Gordon and Anderson 1999). As Yelvington (2001) points out, the dichotomy is in part articulated through the legacies of Boasian anthropologist, Melville Herskovits, and Chicago school sociologist, E. Franklin Frazier. Herskovits' emphasis was on the rediscovery of African "survivals" (or "Africanisms") within diasporic populations despite the forced movement associated with slavery. This contrasts with Frazier's insistence that it was precisely because of forced movement (and the associated "loss" of language, communal/kin ties, customs, etc.) that little to nothing of Africanness remained in descendants of the slave trade. Where the Herskovitsian approach prevailed, dreams for a futuristic, utopian repatriation of black peoples to "Africa" were, when not explicit, often implied (hence, "roots"). Regardless, both of these perspectives stress the idea that forced movement entails a definitive, collective experience of "up-rootedness" from an historical-cultural point of origin ("Africa"). Depending on the degree of Africanness that survives, "Africa" also potentially becomes the logical, indeed an "essential," point of return.

In part as a response to allegations of afrocentrism, and the associated academic panic over essentialism, newer generations of African diaspora studies scholars tend to stress the creative formation of distinctly diasporic, black identities (cf. Gilroy 1995). They speak primarily about identities created out of the processes of historical movement and trans-Atlantic migration itself: black identities that are always, or at least often, symbolically on-the-move (hence "routes"). Good examples include Stuart Hall's (1990) cultural studies approach or the more ethnographic accounts found in Rahier's (1999a) discussion of essentially unessentializable representations of blackness, Thomas and Clarke's (2006) work on the cultural production of blackness, and Gordon's (1998) work on "disparate" diasporas.

Paul Gilroy (1993) argues that during the modern moment it would also be wise to reconsider the self-directed, trans-Atlantic criss-crossings of black intellectuals like Du Bois and Frederick Douglas as another crucial dimension of contemporary African diasporic identities on-the-move. However, Gilroy's perspective is itself worthy of some skepticism, particularly when applied to Latin America. His exclusive emphasis on the (Northern) black Atlantic represents a paradigm that leaves out other, arguably even more "disparate," Diasporas: for example, the peoples of the black Pacific or those of the Afro-Andes (see Feldman 2006; Walsh 2007).

Regardless, the crucial point is that any discussion of roots and routes is also implicitly a discussion of re-rooting and re-routing. The historical emphasis on depictions of forced movement and interpretations of its effects on black consciousness is also now more explicitly informed by discussions of willing movement. In some cases, this means the willing movement and re-constitution of collective selves represented by self-liberated black populations and nations, the

process of black ethno-genesis that Whitten and Torres (1997) describe. The multiple historical instances of resistance to, and escape and refuge from slavery throughout the Americas have unquestionably become central to understanding contemporary Afro-descendant politics. This is evidenced in terms of the widespread reappropriation of *cimarrón* figures as symbolic spokespersons for black identities by some Afro-descendant activists networks, including sometimes those dominated by urban black leaders (e.g., Zumbi in Brazil, Francisco Congo in Peru). It is also evident in terms of the formal processes of institutional recognition and collective land titling of *palenque, quilombolo,* and maroon communities in certain countries, for example in Brazil, Colombia, and Honduras.

However, placing too much emphasis on actions of resistance to, or refuge from, slavery can also elide those processes through which the enslaved navigated their own senses of self precisely from within the institution of slavery. As Trouillot (2003) makes clear, there were specific practices of production and consumption through which slaves crafted their own "differently modern" sense of self. They did so not only as slaves, but also in order to follow different routes in and out of slavery. As is apparent from the occupations of the slave striker, baker, midwife, and others, individual slaves embodied (and were in fact bought/sold as) specialized categories of labor on plantations. They did not merely represent homogeneous, brute labor.

Furthermore, the granting of provisional grounds for their own cultivation and commercialization purposes led to the development of modern consumption habits among slaves. And it was ultimately these practices of "self-cultivation"—practiced from within the institution so easily associated with total self-alienation—that represent a route toward liberation distinct from that of revolt, escape, and refuge usually associated with the image of the maroon. It was, among other things, a route toward self-purchase. After all, the formality of individual and collective "freedom" within slave society—self-liberation through self-purchase—was also a commodity for sale in colonial markets. It was through such actions that freed slaves came to constitute an essential part of the collective known as "libres," a complexly ethno-cultural and racialized category through which many blacks continued to self-identify well into the 20th century (cf. Wade 1997, 1995).

In short, being routed by the will of others also leads to an active re-routing by one's own will and by means of many different paths. Roots said to originate in the soil of "Africa" are more than capable of withstanding, with all the corresponding trauma associated with the process of re-rooting, a transplantation into the soil of the "Americas." For those Diaspora studies scholars who tend to stress a depiction of black identities on-the-move, the same questions always emerge: Do not Afro-descendant populations come to rest somewhere? If not in an imaginary "Africa" then where? And with what consequences for the re-routing and re-rooting associated with African diasporic consciousness?

The roots/routes metaphor has rarely been invoked to explain the contemporary politics and profiles of indigenous peoples, although James Clifford (1994) does so precisely as a means to compare discourses of indigeneity and Diaspora. As Clifford notes, at first glance indigeneity appears to primarily connote a continued rootedness in a distinct place of origin, and thus often evokes an essentialized, immovable identity. In this issue Ng'weno and Greene provide some evidence to that effect. Both the Colombian and Peruvian states conceptualize indigenous rootedness primarily in terms of a long-standing connection to a rural, ancestrally defined, and communal land base. For a claim to indigeneity to become recognizable by institutions of governance (even if it is not fully recognized) it typically must be articulated in terms of a bounded territory of "origin" associated with the group in question. Indigeneity represents a spatial identity that is geographically within but ethno-culturally separate from the contemporary national society. But indigeneity also represents a temporal identity: that of a group that existed before the existence of the contemporary nation-state and only exists now by virtue of a presumed continuity between past and present. Indigenous continuity is often discussed through the language of direct descendence and thus in terms of both ethno-cultures (inheritors of a distinct language, customs, "traits", etc.) and race (inheritors of a distinct biological ancestry).[2]

Amerindian indigeneity thus potentially represents an identity politics directly opposed to those black diasporic identities said to be often on-the-move. In the official view indigenous peoples come to represent a continual rootedness in a soil of collective origin known as the "Americas." We are thus seemingly confronted not with diasporic identities up-rooted and on-the-move but rather indigenized identities still deeply rooted and thus fixed on-the-ground.

As suggested in Clifford's own account, the drawing of a stark contrast between the two runs the risk of overlooking some incredibly important dimensions of both the history and the contemporary horizon of indigeneity: mobility, migration, and—particularly—urbanization. The exponential growth of indigenous migrant sectors within major capital cities (e.g., Quito, Ecuador; Lima, Peru) and the formation of indigenous cities (e.g., El Alto, Bolivia) has led some scholars to re-focus on issues that arise from massive indigenous urbanization in the Andes (see Guss 2006). As my own article (this issue) suggests, there is perhaps an older lesson to be learned from prior attempts to address indigenous urbanism. A lineage of Peruvian scholars, ranging from Aníbal Quijano (see de la Cadena 2006) and José Matos Mar (1984) to José Guillermo Nugent (1992) and Carlos Degregori (1998), have been theorizing the term cholo for quite some time. They see *cholificación,* no doubt genealogically related to de la Cadena's more recent theory of indigenous mestizaje (de la Cadena 2000), as a term that connotes processes of indigenous mobility, urbanization, and migration.

I'd like to read this work on cholification as a way to describe something more than "merely" a contextual phenomenon, exclusive to the Andean countries. This requires rethinking that (Northern) academic view that depicts the global South as a context where broadly comparative theoretical "concepts" are applied but not typically a context from which such concepts emanate. Theories of cholification are an extraordinarily useful way to talk more broadly, indeed more globally, about certain aspects of indigeneity. In particular, we might consider the ways in which such a theory of indigenous mobility creates conceptual links to contemporary African diaspora scholarship. Is there not an interesting parallel between the "roots" implied in afrocentrism/indigeneity and the "routes" implied in African diaspora/cholification?

Permit me but one example of what might be implied here. The horrors associated with the trans-Atlantic voyage on slave ships several hundred years ago is hardly the same as the voyage that the cholo makes: whether from a rural community to life in the informal street economy of a major "Third World" mega-city or, for that matter, to to the global North's foreign cities, small towns, or industrial farms. Yet, I seriously doubt any of the theorists of cholification would defend the thesis that the migratory routes of indigenous peoples are simply the product of "willing" movement. Nor do I think they would characterize them as "forced" movement. The cholo's movements are definitely some complicated mixture of being routed and re-routing oneself.

Likewise, the slave-based economy that historically re-rooted/re-routed Africans in/to the Americas several hundred years ago is hardly the same as the late capitalist economy that has brought indigenous peoples in Latin America to urban centers and foreign countries by the millions in the later half of the 20th century (in search, as economists say, of "opportunity"). Yet, for all his abundant limitations in explaining the relation between slavery, capitalism, and history, Marx made a still relevant comparative observation in this regard. While the enslaved are physically forced into a life of labor for a master, the laboring classes "freely" sell themselves into a life of enslavement to the forces of capitalism:

> When we leave this sphere of simple circulation or the exchange of commodities, which provides the "free trader vulgaris" with his views, his concepts and the standard by which he judges the society of capital and wage-labor, a certain change takes place, or so it appears, in the physiognomy of our dramatis personae. He who was previously the money-owner now strides out in front as a capitalist; the possessor of labour-power follows as his worker. The one smirks self-importantly and is intent on business; the other is timid and holds back, like someone who has brought his own hide to market and now has nothing else to expect but—a tanning. (Marx 1977:280)

To make this comparison relevant to the discussion at hand, the reader might notice, for example, the logical narrative transition that Muñoz Almenerio (this issue)

makes between the legacy of slavery in Peru and the contemporary realities of gang violence, crime, institutionalized racism, debilitating impoverishment, and indigenous urbanization in Lima, Callao. Still living in what was historically one of South America's primary slave ports, contemporary black Peruvians now find themselves face-to-face on a daily basis with those known as cholos (in Peruvian street terms). They arrive from the Andean region to metropolitan Lima by the thousands every year, freely forced to trade in a life of rural marginality for a life of urban informality.

In this issue we continue to explore the important differences in the way African diasporic and indigenous populations are "officially" rendered visible by multicultural states, as well as the differences in the ways Afro-Indigenous actors see themselves, their historical experiences, and each other's struggles. Rethinking the roots/routes metaphor by articulating African diaspora studies with theories of indigenous cholification is not a suggestion that there exists a paradigm of absolute compatibility in Afro-Indigenous subjectivities. Nor should we necessarily seek absolute agreement in the conceptual discussions that surround lo indio and lo negro. It is, however, my suggestion that we rethink approaches that draw too simple a contrast between the apparently ethno-cultural "rootedness" of indigeneity and the apparently racialized "routedness" of Afro-descendants in every context. I have no doubt that this is the contrast that in part explains the apparently "logical" tendency to divide academic labors and study lo indio and lo negro as apparently separate "objects." As Restrepo (this issue) remarks, this is a trend that runs the risk of overlooking the fundamental *relacionalidad* not only of race and culture but also, precisely, of lo indio and lo negro in Latin America.

On Sovereignty (and Guilt)

Previous scholarship attests that there are some important differences in terms of how African diasporic and indigenous populations are (and are not) rendered visible by Latin American states and in other officializing discourses (anthropological representations in particular). Those writing about (or from) Colombia have explored this idea repeatedly. Friedemann (1984) and more recently Restrepo (1997, 2002) stress anthropology's complicity in constructing the indio as the *espejo* (to adopt Restrepo's metaphor) against which studies of Afro-Colombian populations have developed.

Others state the case at broad regional levels. Wade (1997) explains the differences primarily in terms of historical attempts to formally institutionalize and "protect" indigenous identities (through the two republics system, the colonial and late republican recognition of "indian" communities, and the close linkages between

indigenismo and state policy). By contrast, he says, blacks lack a comparable degree of incorporation into state policies since the historical institution of slavery represented only one, among many, profiles of pre-abolition blackness. The lack of a "black" category in national censuses following manumission is another clear indicator of this lack of official visibility (and a continual source of frustration for the development of emerging Afro-descendant policies).

Gordon (1998:121) reminds us that the region-wide trend toward mestizaje models of nationhood—drawing on the implied colonial mixture between the (female) indian and the (male) Spaniard—typically construct the indigenous past as part of the fabric of the nation, effectively excluding blacks from national memory. Finally, Juliet Hooker's (2005) recent comparative politics approach takes this debate to the level of multicultural state reforms. She suggests that states in the region automatically view indigenous populations as "ethno-cultural" Others while conceptualizing the majority of blacks as "racial" Others (albeit with some notable exceptions of those select Afro-descendant groups that do represent ethno-cultural difference). The result, Hooker says, is a region-wide tendency toward the essentialization of ethno-cultures which makes less visible the problems of racism that ultimately impact both Afro-descendant and indigenous populations. According to Hooker, one of the possible conclusions from such work is that in multicultural Latin America Afro-descendants are always rendered less visible. Drawing on Wade's work in this arena she suggests that to become more visible Afro-descendants are presented with the temptation to become more "indian"—which is to say encouraged to work toward ethnification and thus, apparently like indigenous peoples, run the risks of cultural essentialism.[3]

Each of the contributors to this special issue engages somewhat differently with this debate about Afro-descendants' purported invisibility, the apparent "privileging" of indigeneity it involves, and the implied opportunity (or obligation) for Afro-descendants to "go ethnic" in order to gain greater recognition. Whether or not this in fact means that Afro-descendants must imitate indigenous politics seems far from clear. Drawing on his long career documenting both Afro-descendant and indigenous struggles in Ecuador and Colombia, Whitten's contribution suggests that there is considerable ground for talking about the counter-hegemonic nature of zambaje, or Afro-Indigenous mixtures. Zambaje represents another route, he says, one that in effect circumvents the implied contrast to European whiteness found in both mestizaje and mulataje. Anderson suggests we consider "afroindigeneity" in other ways, indeed, in certain circumstances as a dehyphenated politics and practice. The Garifuna activists he works with in Honduras act to effectively indigenize Africanness to the Americas. They are not becoming so much "like" indigenous peoples as they are actively constituting themselves as distinctly Afro-Indigenous people (i.e., indigenous Afro-Americans in the sense of constituting a

people with a sense of place before the historical existence of the Honduran nation-state).

Ng'weno argues that one of the crucial things underspecified in the literature about Colombia, as it relates to global discourses of indigeneity and to claims made by Afro-Colombians, is the underlying importance of land. Land, she says, is in large part what defines the boundaries of the indigenous in Colombia, as elsewhere. As a result it is also what defines the boundaries between those Afro-Colombians (the Pacific coast) who are attributed an ethno-cultural status and those from other regions (the Caribbean coast, and urban areas) who are not. Here, Restrepo's mention of the importance of biodiversity politics on the Pacific coast, and the way it serves to legitimate local Afro-Colombians' claims to a distinct cultural relation to nature, confirms Ng'weno's analysis of land conflicts and legal cases in other parts of Colombia. Finally, my own article suggests that in the Peruvian case, ideas about race and culture are virtually inseparable from the ways they are inscribed on intra-regional spaces in the national imagination. The apparent "privilege" held by (neo-Incaic) Andeans creates an interesting point of comparison for thinking about the representations of (coastal) Afro-Peruvians and (Amazonian) natives. In that context, ideologies of nation-building center more around a quest for the returning Inca than they do around discourses of mestizaje.

After reflecting on this broader literature and the way our contributions fit into it, two things strike me as virtually absent in most of the contemporary accounts of multiculturalism in Latin America: guilt and sovereignty. Indeed, while it is not nearly as well-developed as it might be in the articles represented here, there is, I believe, an implied discussion of how (white-mestizo) state guilt directly influences the logics of sovereignty that operate within Afro-Indigenous multiculturalisms. We might ask ourselves whether to apply Barkan's (2000) clever reappropriation of Adam Smith to Latin America. It is in part an acknowledgement by institutions of governance of the connections between race, culture, colonialism, and slavery that now haunts discussions about how, where, and by whom the historical "wealth of nations" was amassed.

What emerges is an era of "self-critically" moralistic, indeed openly apologetic, governance, or as Barkan suggests, an era characterized by "the guilt of nations." Although he doesn't make much at all of the whiteness (much less the possible white-mestizaje) of such guilt, Barkan's identification of apologetic modes of governance represents an interesting point to consider. To me, the rhetorically self-critical, and apparently apologetic, dimensions of states' attempts to confront historical injustices are clearly operable within the sphere of Afro-Indigenous multiculturalisms. The problem is always found in those vested interests that make it difficult, if not impossible, to implement programs that fully address contemporary demands for social justice.[4]

Also underdeveloped in discussions of multiculturalism are the logics of popular sovereignty implied in multicultural governance models. Following Agamben's *Homo Sacer* and the re-readings of Carl Schmitt and Foucault it offers, it has become somewhat fashionable to speak of sovereignty (see Hansen and Stepputat 2005). I'm less interested, however, in identifying the "state of exception" through which sovereignty is constituted than I am in the positive content that modern, democratic polities are presumed to represent. Post 1789 such polities typically define popular sovereignty in terms of the recognition of a "people" to whom sovereignty belongs and for which the term "nation" becomes more or less a synonym. The question then becomes: Under state multicultural reforms what changes as the term "people" itself becomes the object of significant contestations?

While not always dealt with directly in the contributions to this issue, logics of popular sovereignty do emerge in very interesting ways in our discussion of the Afro-Indigenous governance models that attend to Latin America's so-called "multicultural turn." Notice the connection Ng'weno makes between ethnic difference, state recognition, and land (i.e., a delimited territorial boundary which makes an ethnic group "governable") in Colombia. And notice the emphasis Anderson places on the Garifuna's claims to "peoplehood."

In fact, I'm convinced that "peoplehood"—to be or become recognizable as *un pueblo*—is quite central to the apologetic politics of multicultural governance. It is also therefore central to the fuzzy line scholars are intent on redrawing between "race" and "ethno-cultures" (even when acknowledging their relational, contextual character). Often implied in state campaigns of Afro-Indigenous recognition is what I have come to think of as the "holy trinity" of multicultural "peoplehood." Culture + language + territory = un pueblo. To have "legitimate" claims to all three is, it seems, necessary to be considered a recognizable, even if not fully recognized, collective: a semi-sovereign polity within but defined against the national one. To be perceived as missing one or more of these key ingredients (and especially the ingredient of "culture" as Restrepo [this issue] reminds us) is to be considered already absorbed by another, fully recognized collective: the formally sovereign polity of the nation-state itself.

More specifically, I am interested in interrogating how and why this logic of politico-cultural community is projected onto certain Afro-Indigenous subjects while it is in effect denied to others. Hansen and Stepputat's work suggests that modern states' notion of popular sovereignty was created out of the exclusions of colonized, enslaved, and other disenfranchised populations. As a result, "large numbers of poor, marginalized, or ethnic others as outsiders" continue to be "people who are not yet ready to become citizens or included in the true political-cultural community" (2005:36). While this is undoubtedly true I would argue that they overlook the ways in which contemporary states now seek, rhetorically at least,

to reconstitute themselves as multicultural societies precisely in an attempt to apologize for these past exclusions. In so doing states begin to recognize, that is to say they prove willing to semi-recognize, the sovereignty (and thus the sense of "political-cultural community") that was previously denied these Others. Or, as it turns out, states pick and choose when and where they will semi-recognize a very select few of these previously non-recognized Others.

What emerges is a different kind of "exclusive inclusion" than the one Agamben imagines in *Homo Sacer*. The multicultural inclusion offered to such historical Others—and the semi-recognition of sovereignty it implies—always hides other mechanisms that work to continue denying sovereignty to still others. The guilt states appear to express in implicitly recognizing the denials of sovereignty to Others through European colonization and trans-Atlantic slavery is never disinterested. The apology offered through multicultural reforms and affirmative action policies are always just shy of sincere.

In terms of Afro-Indigenous recognition processes in Latin America, the general patterns of inequality in the processes of semi-recognition seem clear. Those indigenous peoples recognized as still maintaining strong ties to a distinct cultural practice, a distinctly non-European language, and a "more or less" bounded (rural/ancestral) collective territory come to represent the most recognizable semi-sovereign collectives. Make no mistake. I'm not suggesting that states are actually willing to significantly dilute their own claims to sovereignty through partial recognition of the semi-sovereignty of indigenous groups. Inoach Shawit's article (this issue) clearly expresses the palpable ideological limits on indigenous demands to be considered as nations within nations. As he points out, the term "nation" becomes at one and the same time a term synonymous with (national) "culture" and "people" and a term that historically elides the existence of other (sub-national, or even inter-national) "cultures" and "peoples" that don't correspond with national boundaries. Those multicultural states that have arguably gone farther in recognizing indigenous rights to semi-sovereignty continue to choose their language very carefully. For example, in Article 83 of Ecuador's 1998 Constitution the state recognizes that indigenous peoples "define themselves as nations" ("Los pueblos indígenas, que se autodefinen como nacionalidades de raíces ancestrales") in response to the widespread appropriation of the term *nacionalidad* by indigenous activists. The state itself of course does not define them as such. In effect, "multicultural" and "multiethnic" rhetoric becomes a strategically "safe" alternative to protect against the apparent threat that an explicit recognition of "multi-nationalism" might imply to state sovereignty.

Here, I'm simply suggesting that institutions of governance tend to project sovereign logics onto the multicultural populations they help to constitute even while continuing to carefully circumscribe the rights of sovereignty that presumably

accompany such logics. Furthermore, the impact of multiculturalism makes states willing to partially recognize the semi-sovereignty of certain collectives that meet the criteria of a pueblo, while simultaneously enabling them to deny the potential for semi-sovereign peoplehood of others that apparently don't. The larger point to be made is that they do so now in a rhetorically self-critical mode: wishing (no doubt with the "best of intentions") to repair the colonial traumas of the past with an apologetic politics of the multicultural present.

For those indigenous groups who appear to meet the pueblo criteria, there is a hidden logic of retention that predominates in the sphere of apologetic multicultural governance. Recognizable indigeneity often depends on the idea that the contemporary existence of non-European cultural practices and languages operating within certain (ancestral/rural) territories translates into an apparently "successful" retention of the indigenous sovereignty that was denied through colonization. The fact that indigenous peoples in this hemisphere are often represented as the true native "Americans"—that is to say those most deeply rooted in the soil of the "Americas"—no doubt influences this perception of "Amerindian" identity directly.

Noticeably excluded from such a picture are the complex processes associated with cholification, representing those millions of migratory indigenes and mobile indigenous urbanites who find themselves in a position that is much more difficult for multicultural states to reconcile, since they are typically not even explicitly recognized. My own article (this issue) would hopefully push this idea a bit further. In certain contexts there are significant distinctions to be made about different classes and spaces of indigenous identity as well: between, for example, mythical Andeans whose pre-Colombian sovereignty is essentially fused with the modern Peruvian state's sovereignty and Amazonians whose contemporary semi-sovereignty is still effectively denied despite multicultural recognition.

What exactly this means for Afro-descendants—who in the "official" view represent peoples indigenous to "Africa" who were forcefully routed to the "Americas"—is a slightly different matter. As Hooker (2005) points out, the majority have not received a collective ethno-cultural recognition that translates into a form of semi-recognizable, semi-sovereign peoplehood. By the apologetic logics of multicultural sovereignty an Afro-descendant living in the "Americas" appears to lack legitimacy in the claim to being part of a distinct pueblo, sufficiently different from and sufficiently rooted before the modern, national one (cf. Ng'weno, this issue). At one level predominates a logic of permanent loss. An imaginary, far off, "Africa" continually looms on the horizon as the only "legitimate" space/place from which semi-recognizable claims to being Afro-descendant pueblos (i.e., complete with African cultures, languages, and territories) can be ancestrally (and thus recognizably) rooted. If such a logic of loss is operative, the collective non-recognition of Afro-descendant pueblos in the "Americas" is implied, as is the notion that the denial of sovereignty

represented by slavery thrusts Afro-descendants into a condition of terminal "uprootedness."

But here we should also take notice of the exceptions that prove the rule by looking at the pattern among those Afro-descendant groups that have gained something close to a semi-recognizable, semi-sovereign collective recognition by contemporary multicultural states. They are, almost inevitably it seems, those represented as (rural/ancestral) members of cimarrón/quilombolo or some other kind of maroon communities. In the apologetic multicultural view they thus represent those who willfully retook the sovereignty that was taken from them following their capture and commodification in the slave trade, or, at a minimum, took refuge from an institution that is supposed to have eliminated every aspect of their collective (as well as individual) self. I believe that what predominates here is not a logic of (partial) retention like that which appears to be guiding certain processes of indigenous recognition. Instead, what predominates is a logic of recuperation. These are populations who, according to the apologetic multicultural view, are defined by the specific acts associated with the willful actions of the cimarrón (as represented by the notions of "escape" from, "refuge" from, and "resistance" to slavery). Thus, what is also implied in the logic of sovereign recuperation is a successful reconstitution of African pueblos, most notably in or around the historical maroon communities that existed on the "outside" of and against the institution of slavery: a re-routing that leads to a willful re-rooting in the soil of the "Americas" (after an original uprooting from "Africa").

This may mean that those Afro-descendants who do gain ethno-cultural recognition are not becoming so much "like" indigenous peoples as they are becoming the only Afro-descendants who are semi-recognizable as semi-sovereign pueblos, as "legitimately" Afro-American peoples (i.e., the most "Africanized" peoples in the "Americas"). Those who survived through slavery, those who navigated within slavery, those who purchased their way out of slavery and, of course, those who helped build what were originally sovereign "criollo" nations (long before they became "mestizo" nations) are—not unlike the re-routed and re-rooted cholos—in a position much more difficult to recognize.

If there is anything at all to these logics of retention, loss, and recuperation, one is forced to wonder if this represents a continuance of a colonial, slave-holding mentality within the very mode of multicultural governance that now seeks to apologize for colonialism and slavery. There are, at any rate, several implied assumptions about what kinds of Afro-Indigeneity can be constituted through contemporary multiculturalisms and what kinds cannot.

The logic of retention found in indigenous recognition processes might well signify the continuance of a "protectionist" colonial policy. Or, what is worse still,

this might signal an assumption that the various colonial, republican, and indigenista efforts to "protect" the "indian" somehow worked, despite several centuries of colonization, forced labor, servitude, segregation, assimilation campaigns, and other forms of marginalization. States apologize for the history of colonization and its legacies within contemporary nations only to effectively deny the tremendous impact it had on indigenous populations. They also effectively deny the importance of past and present forms of indigenous migratory mobility as well as the circulation of indigeneity within urban centers.

In the logics of loss and recuperation there are perhaps still signs of a "master" mentality. In this case, the multicultural apologist assumes that the sovereignty, and along with it all the signs of a willing agent and all the collective senses of peoplehood, that was denied Africans who were sold into slavery was necessarily lost—unless they escaped from the institution of slavery in order to recuperate that sense of semi-sovereign selfhood. States apologize for slavery and its legacies within contemporary nations only to effectively deny the tremendous possibilities for other collective and other willful forms of crafting selfhood, forms that were born precisely from the experiences of enslavement, forced migration, and resettlement in the Americas.

The multicultural logics of loss, retention, and recuperation as they map differently onto processes encountered in Afro-Indigenous multiculturalisms thus imply several extremely important problems in the contemporary politics of recognition. There is an on-going denial of the collectively creative processes associated with urbanizing, mobilizing, and diasporic populations (be they Africanized or cholified). There is also an on-going denial of the fact that varied experiences of loss, recuperation, and retention are shared by Afro-Indigenous populations from most all of their contemporary positions.

At a minimum, what the logics of loss, retention, and recuperation imply is an on-going inability to fully articulate the guilt of nation-states' past into a more progressive, and hopefully one day less emptily apologetic, politics of the present. There is, after all, a lot at stake when states begin to recognize some Afro-Indigenous actors and fail to recognize others. To not recognize these other possibilities for the creation and recreation of Afro-Indigenous pueblos is to assure that the politics of recognition remains *sumamente manejable*. To strategically not recognize other Afro-Indigenous peoples is to assure that the fully recognized sovereignty of the state—its power to decide who lives and who dies, its power to decide where to seek justice and where to overlook it—remains sacred. Those Afro-Indigenous pueblos who become semi-recognizable are expected to remain, from the state's point of view, largely rural and immobile; those who represent themselves as more urban and mobile usually do not enjoy the benefits of collective recognition.

By Way of Concluding

I would like to close by admitting that there are multiple lines of analysis that are virtually absent in our discussions in this issue. It seems only fair to acknowledge them from the outset.

The various (subject) positions from which each of the authors included here writes is left largely implicit although their juxtaposition was explicit in the original design. There are multiple differences worthy of note. I'll mention only one. While my two Peruvian activist colleagues contributing to the "Actualidades" section present perspectives that could be interpreted within the debates about Afro-Indigenous visibility, in terms of race versus ethno-culture, neither one of them expends as much energy over-intellectualizing as the academics (here and elsewhere) are wont to do. They invest their energy in describing knowledge gained from experiences of having participated directly in Afro-Indigenous politics and programs. Muñoz Almenerio's article opens with an extraordinarily important statement about being black in Peru: "Mis 20 años de experiencia en el proceso organizativo del pueblo afroperuano me han permitido identificar que uno de nuestros grandes retos es lograr ser aceptados y reconocidos como pueblo." Is this not clearly a comment about the way the logics of multicultural sovereignty play into the issue of black invisibility? Surely it is. But he then concludes with the analysis of an intercultural educational project he's currently engaged in which foregrounds the possible equivalences that Afro-descendant and migrant indigenous school children face with regard to racial discrimination and ethno-cultural non-recognition in Lima, Callao.

Inoach Shawit's article emphasizes the importance of multicultural recognition for indigenous peoples across the Andean nations. But then again he concludes with the extraordinary statement: "El multiculturalismo en el enfoque actual no es aquello que debe estar centrado solamente en la identidad cultural y lingüística de los pueblos indígenas u originarios, sino hay que admitir que los procesos vividos y convividos a lo largo de la historia con diferentes culturas nos han legado como herencia una serie de 'valores agregados' que en fin ayudan a expandir la forma de ver el mundo que tienen otras sociedades." What more essentially unessentializable notion of indigeneity could anyone ask for?

There is always the chance that academic debates–whether focused too narrowly or intellectualized too vigorously—become yet another mode of blurring, rather than clarifying, all that is at stake in multiculturalisms for those who seek greater recognition and clearer signs of social progress. I'm not suggesting that there is no shared ground between the academic and activist points of view represented here (or elsewhere); nor that academics and activism are mutually exclusive categories of practice. I am suggesting that the production of academic and activist knowledges, struggles, and experiences are rarely, if ever, one and the same. This is, as far as I am

concerned, all the more reason to present such perspectives together rather than trying to carefully keep them apart.

And thus I suppose that one might read this "introduction" as having gone from the perspective of the "guilt of nations" only to potentially arrive at the "guilt of notions." In putting together the issue, I sought to make neither too much—nor too little—of the relation between a theoretical politics of difference and the practice of a different kind of politics. Whether or not this issue achieves something resembling the right balance I'll leave for others—including of course my willing collaborators here—to judge.

Probably most noticeable in terms of this issue's silent omissions are the dimensions of gender and generation which clearly play a tremendously important role in shaping the horizon of Afro-Indigenous multiculturalisms. Others have already taken up the questions of how race and cultural politics take place through and sometimes in opposition to the politics of gender (see de la Cadena 2000; Weismantel 2001; Safa 2005; Htun 2004b). The role of generation, even in terms of the simplest of oppositions between "youth" and "elder," seems unquestionably important. When addressed specifically to issues of education one can hardly avoid it (cf. Muñoz Almenerio, this issue).

But rather than feel overly apologetic about these or any other issues that are left unmentioned we simply expect, as a matter of course, that other interested interlocutors will come along to further complicate or clarify the picture presented here. In fact, we welcome it.

Acknowledgments

Notes

[1]It is worth noting that Htun's (2004a) work primarily contrasts the affirmative action logic of gender quotas with the multicultural logic of ethnic recognition processes. I take some liberties with her argument about "self-cancellation" vs. "self-perpetuation" in order to link it to the debate about "race" vs. "ethno-cultures."

[2]Here, one might object by bringing up a comparison to Native North America where the issue of "blood quantum" makes the racial dimensions of indigenous identity recognition explicit. However, despite the apparent absence of such legalized biological measures to constitute indigeneity in most of Latin America, we should recall that the discourse of "mestizaje" (i.e., the ideology against which many forms of indigeneity are constructed in the region) is among other things also a discourse about blood mixtures.

[3]Notably, not all studies of Afro-Latinos come to the same conclusion about black invisibility. See, for example, Rahier's (1999b) discussion that Afro-descendants' instead represent the "ultimate Other" in Latin American contexts. The discourse of "invisibility" does appear to be popular among Afro-descendant activists, although this would also appear somewhat ambiguous following titles like "No Longer Invisible" which declares an emergence from invisibility (see Minority Rights Group 1995).

[4]Readers will wonder of course how the (white) guilt of nations relates to the (white) guilt of a discipline like anthropology or for that matter particular practitioners of it. As one of my collaborators in this issue insightfully pointed out, thinking about guilt also forces us to consider "guilt's cousin," resentment. Although it is unquestionably risky to relegate such concerns to a footnote (even riskier to not mention it all) there are also good reasons to do so here. One could potentially re-read the various self-critiques of anthropology partially in terms of guilt/resentment (e.g., Hymes, 1972; Asad 1973; Trouillot 1991) as well as the various criticisms from without (e.g., Deloria 1969). The renewed emphasis on "activist" and "engaged" anthropology—particularly as it refocuses on anthropology's familiar "objects/subjects" of study (e.g., Hale 2006b) – could also potentially be understood as something of an exercise in anthropological apologetics. Determining the question of sincerity in such apologetics would of course be a matter of examining particular cases. But such a discussion is far beyond what one can achieve in a single introduction. I leave aside any mention of individual guilt for what should be some very obvious reasons. Engaged in a collaborative enterprise that takes multicultural states as the primary object of analysis it would be foolish of me to try to derive from this the "inner states" of my collaborators in this enterprise. I'll leave the exploration of my own "inner state" for a piece that is not predicated on a collaborative venture.

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